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TamingDNS status

Answered our latest tool-list check 4 hours ago with 19 tools. It will be marked verified after 3 successful checks in 7 days.

Answered (30 days)
2 of 2 checks
Last seen working
17 Nov, 06:16 UTC
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We call this hosted server's tools/list endpoint without credentials, from the public internet, every day while it answers and weekly otherwise.

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Checked (UTC)ResultResponse timeTools
17 Nov, 06:16Answered0.8 s19
16 Nov, 06:15Answered0.6 s19

Tools (19)

Read from the server on 17 Nov 2026.

check_spf
Check the SPF record for a domain. Returns the raw record, grade (A-F), the terminal `all` qualifier (resolved through redirect= chains), structured findings (NEAR_LOOKUP_LIMIT, LOOKUP_LIMIT_EXCEEDED, PLUS_ALL_DANGEROUS, PTR_MECHANISM_DEPRECATED, etc.), and an `analysis` block with the expanded include/redirect tree and the RFC 7208 §4.6.4 lookup count. Read-only.
check_dkim
Look up a DKIM public key at <selector>._domainkey.<domain> and validate it. Detects key revocation (empty p=), RSA key length (KEY_TOO_SHORT below 1024, KEY_WEAK below 2048), SHA-1 hash deprecation, and t=y test mode. For selector1/selector2 it also checks a Microsoft 365 CNAME target carries the token Microsoft builds for the domain (M365_DKIM_CNAME_MISMATCH), even when no key resolves. Returns
discover_dkim
Find a domain's DKIM keys without knowing the selector. Looks up every selector in the TamingDNS database (over 500, covering Google Workspace, Microsoft 365, SendGrid, Mailchimp, Amazon SES and over 100 other named providers) plus the *._domainkey wildcard, and validates each key it finds the way check_dkim does (KEY_TOO_SHORT, KEY_WEAK, KEY_REVOKED, M365_DKIM_CNAME_MISMATCH and the rest). When t
check_dmarc
Check the _dmarc record for a domain with DUAL discovery: the RFC 7489 §6.6.3 organisational-domain ladder (what major receivers enforce today — grade/verdict anchor to it) AND the RFC 9989 §4.10 DNS Tree Walk (8-query cap, psd=n/y stop rules, fewest-labels org selection) into analysis.discovery {legacy, tree_walk, diverges}. When the two methods select different policy records or org domains, DIS
check_tls_rpt
Check the TLS-RPT (SMTP TLS Reporting, RFC 8460) record at _smtp._tls.<domain>. Strict §3 classification: the record must BEGIN with the case-sensitive v=TLSRPTv1 tag, more than one such record means receivers treat TLS-RPT as not implemented, and rua= is required. Validates every rua= destination syntactically (mailto:/https:// — reachability is never probed), and detects the MTA-STS and DANE pre
check_mta_sts
Check MTA-STS (RFC 8461) for a domain: the _mta-sts TXT record (strict §3.1 selection — case-sensitive leading v=STSv1, exactly one record, required 1-32 alphanumeric id), the policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt fetched WITHOUT following redirects (§3.3), strict §3.2 policy validation (version/mode/max_age required, mx required unless mode none, max_age ≤ 31557600, dupl
check_bimi
Check default._bimi.<domain>: parses the BIMI record, validates the SVG Tiny-PS logo, inspects the VMC chain (expiry, EKU, SCT, issuer-accepted, SAN match, logotype hash), and verifies the DMARC prerequisite (p=quarantine/reject at pct=100 with no sp=none — the RFC 7489 reading Gmail and Apple Mail evaluate today). DMARCbis (RFC 9989) aware: t= is parsed into analysis.dmarc.t, t=y emits TESTING_MO
check_dane
Check SMTP DANE / TLSA records for a domain (RFC 7672). Resolves the MX hosts (falls back to the apex when none), looks up the TLSA record at _25._tcp.<mx-host> over binary DoH, classifies each record (usage 0-3 / selector 0-1 / matching 0-2 per RFC 7671 §2.1), and confirms the answer carried the DNSSEC AD bit — DANE is meaningless without DNSSEC, so an unsigned TLSA answer is the dominant failure
check_dnssec
Validate a domain's DNSSEC chain of trust. Pulls DS (at the parent), DNSKEY, and RRSIG over binary DoH, walks the chain zone-by-zone (root → TLD → domain) recomputing each DS digest against the published DNSKEYs (RFC 4034 §5.1.4), and cross-checks the AD bit across Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, and OpenDNS so a single resolver's caching can't mask a break. Returns grade (A-F) with grade_reasons, a ve
check_mx
Inspect a domain's MX / mail-routing posture. Resolves the apex MX RRset (priority-sorted), and for each host the A/AAAA addresses, PTR + forward-confirmed reverse DNS (FCrDNS), DANE TLSA at _25._tcp.<host>, IP-literal (RFC 5321 §5) and CNAME (RFC 2181 §10.3) violations, and the mail provider. Detects the null MX (RFC 7505), a null MX wrongly mixed with real MX, and the implicit MX via the apex A/
check_m365
Audit a domain's DNS against what Microsoft 365 expects: SPF includes spf.protection.outlook.com, DKIM selector1/selector2 (CNAME target and key), DMARC policy and rua=, MX to Microsoft 365 (*.mail.protection.outlook.com or *.mx.microsoft), MTA-STS, Autodiscover to autodiscover.outlook.com, TLS-RPT, BIMI, and the Teams SIP SRV records. Built from the same envelopes check_spf, check_dkim, check_dma
check_google_workspace
Audit a domain's DNS against what Google Workspace expects: MX to Google (smtp.google.com, or the legacy aspmx hosts Google still supports), SPF includes _spf.google.com, a DKIM key at the default google selector (google._domainkey), DMARC policy and rua=, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT and BIMI. Built from the same envelopes check_spf, check_dkim, check_dmarc, check_mx, check_mta_sts, check_tls_rpt and check_b
check_dns_propagation
Ask 14 public DoH resolvers in North and South America, Europe and Asia (Google, Cloudflare, Quad9, CIRA, Comcast, Mullvad, DNSPod, IIJ, DNS.SB and more) for one record type at one name, and report whether they agree. Use it after changing a record to see whether the change has spread. `resolvers[]` gives every resolver's answer (`values`, `ttl`, `status` agree / disagree / unavailable), so compar
check_txt
Inventory a domain's TXT records and say what is wrong with them. Reads every TXT at the apex and labels each one by vendor or purpose (SPF, Google, Microsoft, Atlassian, Stripe and over a hundred more, grouped into categories), then reads 12 well-known names (_dmarc, _mta-sts, _smtp._tls, default._bimi, _acme-challenge, _amazonses and other provider tokens). Findings: TXT_MULTIPLE_SPF_LIKE (error
decode_bounce
Decode a pasted bounce: a full NDR email, an SMTP error line or a mail-log fragment. Finds the SMTP reply code and the enhanced status code (RFC 3463 X.Y.Z), names the provider that sent it (Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, Apple, Comcast, Proofpoint, Mimecast, Barracuda), and returns what the code means and how to fix it. `verdict` is permanent (5xx, finding BOUNCE_PERMANENT, status fail), temporary (4x
analyze_dmarc_report
Read one DMARC aggregate (RUA) report, the XML a receiver sends to the rua= address, pasted as text (decompress a .xml.gz first). Returns who reported and when (analysis.report), the policy the domain published (analysis.policy), message totals and the split into DMARC-capable, forwarded (SPF failed, DKIM aligned) and unauthenticated (both failed) mail, every source row with its IP, count, disposi
check_website
Web-layer triage of one public hostname, the scan the /website page runs: A/AAAA with reverse DNS and ASN, CAA, the HTTPS redirect chain, the TLS certificate (issuer, SANs, expiry, WebPKI trust, TLS version), security headers (HSTS, CSP, X-Frame-Options, nosniff, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy) and cookie flags, HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 advertisement, whether plain http:// redirects to https, mixed
check_mcp_keys
Read the v=MCPv1 TXT records at a domain, the keys the MCP Registry DNS login (mcp-publisher login dns) verifies a signature against, and judge each the way the registry does: v=MCPv1; k=<algorithm>; p=<key> in that order and case, k exactly ed25519 or ecdsap384, p padded standard base64 of a 32-byte ed25519 key or a 49-byte compressed P-384 point that lies on the curve. `verdict` is not_configure
analyze_email_headers
Analyse a pasted block of raw email headers for spoofing and phishing tells. Input is the raw headers (everything up to the first blank line — "Show original" / "View source"); the message body is not required. Returns structured findings + a phishing verdict (one of likely_phishing, verify_sender, minor_concerns, legitimate, auth_incomplete) derived from SPF/DKIM/DMARC alignment (RFC 7489 §3.1),