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Answered our latest tool-list check 16 hours ago with 200 tools. It will be marked verified after 3 successful checks in 7 days.

Answered (30 days)
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16 Nov, 18:16 UTC
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We call this hosted server's tools/list endpoint without credentials, from the public internet, every day while it answers and weekly otherwise.

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Checked (UTC)ResultResponse timeTools
16 Nov, 18:16Answered3.9 s200

Tools (200)

Read from the server on 16 Nov 2026.

create_verification
Create a new identity verification. Initiates a verification flow for an asset identifier (phone number, email, domain, social handle, wallet address, account, or Telegram bot). Agent usage: pass the asset `type`, the delivery `channel`, and the `identifier` (e.g. type "phone", channel "sms", identifier "+37060000000"; or type "email", channel "email", identifier "user@example.com"). The response
get_verification
Get a verification by ID. Returns the full verification object including status, channel, and proof token if verified. Before calling this for a challenge you created, make sure your reply text already shows the user what to act on — the link itself, the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox; a link that appeared only in a tool result is one they never saw. ACCESS: needs a Proof acco
list_verifications
List verifications with optional filters. Returns paginated results. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
trigger_verification
Trigger a DNS/HTTP verification check for a pending domain verification. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
submit_verification_code
Submit an OTP/challenge code for a pending verification. Accepted ONLY where we delivered the code out-of-band to the party being verified: type "email", and type "domain" with channel "email". Any other pair answers 400 unsupported_for_type and completes elsewhere — use trigger_verification (POST /verifications/:id/verify) for a domain over dns/http/auto; a phone completes when the code reaches u
resend_verification
Resend a verification message (email channel only). Generates and sends a new code. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
test_verify
Auto-complete a verification in test mode (pk_test_* API keys only). Useful for testing flows without real OTP delivery. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_verified_users
List verified users grouped by external_user_id. Shows all verifications per user. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_verified_user
Get a single verified user and their verifications by external user ID. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
start_domain_verification
Start a B2B domain verification. Creates a verification record and returns DNS/HTTP instructions for the customer to complete. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
check_domain_verification
Check the status of a pending domain verification. Triggers a DNS/HTTP check and returns the updated status. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
delete_domain_verification
Delete a domain verification attempt that is not verified (pending, verifying or failed) — nothing is revoked. A verified domain, or one that needs re-verification, is refused with domain_verified: removing it revokes its proofs and every delegation issued from it, which is delete_domain in a start_login session (or the dashboard). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Co
wait_for_verification
Poll a verification until it reaches a terminal state (verified, failed, expired, revoked, or cancelled). Uses exponential backoff (2s initial, 1.5x, 30s max) with jitter. A multi-channel verification that lost the race is "cancelled" and one whose proof was withdrawn is "revoked"; both are final, so the wait returns rather than polling on. Before calling this for a challenge you created, make sur
create_multi_channel_verification
Create a multi-channel phone verification: one phone number challenged over several channels at once (OR / first-wins). The first channel the user completes wins, yields a single proof token, and cancels the losing siblings. Exactly one proof is billed, at the winning channel's completion — not one per channel, and nothing at creation. Agent usage: the response includes a `group_id` (format vg_<he
get_multi_channel_verification_status
Get the status of a multi-channel verification group by its group_id. Returns the aggregate status (pending/verified/expired), the winning_channel once one completes, per-channel statuses, and the proof token (with expires_at) when the group is verified. Before calling this for a challenge you created, make sure your reply text already shows the user what to act on — the link itself, the SMS text
create_verification_request
Create a multi-asset verification request. Allows verifying multiple assets (phone, email, domain, social, wallet, account, telegram_bot) in a single flow. Give the recipient the returned verification_url; wait_for_request or get_verification_request then reads its progress until it is completed, expired or cancelled. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Aut
get_verification_request
Get a verification request by ID. Returns the request with all its asset verification statuses. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_request_proofs
Get proof tokens for verified assets in a verification request. Returns proof tokens that can be used for offline verification. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_verification_requests
List verification requests with optional filters. Returns paginated results. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_request_by_reference
Get a verification request by its reference ID (your unique identifier). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
cancel_verification_request
Cancel a pending verification request. Only pending requests can be cancelled. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
wait_for_request
Poll a verification request until it reaches a terminal state (completed, expired, or cancelled). Uses exponential backoff (2s initial, 1.5x, 30s max) with jitter. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
validate_proof
Validate a proof token online. Checks the token signature, expiry, and revocation status against the server, and optionally that the proof is about the identifier you expect. Public endpoint — no API key required.
get_proof_status
Get the status of a proof by its public handle (ph_ctl_* / ph_dlg_*) or a verification ID. Returns whether the proof is active, suspended, expired, or revoked — a live proof reads "active". ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
revoke_proof
Revoke a proof by its public handle (ph_ctl_* / ph_dlg_*) or a verification ID — the same addresses get_proof_status takes. The proof token will no longer validate anywhere: the status endpoint, the public validator, the revocation list and the Token Status List all report it revoked. A domain CONTROL proof (a ph_ctl_* of a domain) also revokes, for good, every delegation issued from it; for a dom
pause_proof
Pause a proof by its public handle (ph_ctl_* / ph_dlg_*) or a verification ID — a reversible stop, undone with resume_proof. While paused the proof is invalid: the status endpoint, the public validator and the Token Status List report it suspended; it is deliberately NOT put on the revocation list. Only an active proof can be paused (already_suspended, proof_expired or proof_revoked otherwise). Pa
resume_proof
Resume a proof paused with pause_proof, by the same handle (ph_ctl_* / ph_dlg_*) or verification ID: it validates again everywhere, and a resumed delegation is honoured again by gated publishers on their next status check. Only the paused row flips back — a proof revoked while paused stays revoked, and a handle whose own row is not the paused one answers not_suspended. The API key needs proofs:wri
list_revoked_proofs
Get the revocation list for offline proof validation. Returns a signed list of all revoked proof IDs. Reuse a fetched list for up to 5 minutes (its cache lifetime), then fetch it again to see new revocations; if you cannot, its signature stays verifiable offline for 1 hour.
get_proof_token
Get the current token of a proof you own, by its public ph_ctl_* handle. After a signing-key rotation this is the re-signed token, which replaces any older copy you hold. Each read is audited. A revoked or expired proof answers proof_not_live; a suspended one is still served. The proof of one of the account's own verified assets (a domain, phone or email verified on the account itself) answers own
list_reissued_proofs
List your proofs whose token was re-signed at or after an instant, oldest first — what to re-fetch after a signing-key rotation, for example when a webhook was missed. Items are references {proof_id, reissued_at, token_url}, never tokens: pull a ph_ctl_* item with get_proof_token and a ph_dlg_* item with get_delegation_token. Proofs of the account's own verified assets are not listed here (the API
get_delegation_token
Get the current token of an active delegation by its public ph_dlg_* handle — after a signing-key rotation, the re-signed token to publish in place of the old one. Public endpoint — no API key required, since the token is already published with the delegation. Any handle that is not an active delegation (revoked, suspended, expired or unknown) answers the same not_found.
create_session
Create a new phone verification session. Returns deep_link, qr_code (base64 PNG), and qr_text (UTF-8 text QR for terminal display). Sessions provide a hosted verification flow with callbacks. Agent usage: After creating a session, pass the response's `deep_link` to render_auth_link so the user can open or scan it. Never hand `qr_text` to a link renderer — it is that link already rendered as QR art
get_session
Get a session by ID. Returns the session status, verification details, and proof token if verified. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
wait_for_session
Poll a session until it reaches a terminal state (verified, failed, or expired). Uses exponential backoff (2s initial, 1.5x, 30s max) with jitter. Before calling this for a challenge you created, make sure your reply text already shows the user what to act on — the link itself, the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox; a link that appeared only in a tool result is one they never saw
list_my_proofs
List all verified assets for the authenticated user. Assets are verified identities (phones, emails, domains). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_assets
Deprecated: use list_my_proofs
get_my_proof
Get a single verified asset by ID. Returns details including type, value, status, and verification timestamps. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_asset
Deprecated: use get_my_proof
revoke_my_proof
Revoke EVERY proof of one of your assets (a phone, email or domain), by its asset id from list_my_proofs — the asset stays on the account. A ph_ctl_* / ph_dlg_* handle is one proof, not an asset: revoke that with revoke_proof. Owner only: sign in with start_login (a connection with only an API key is refused user_session_required — a key revokes a proof with revoke_proof instead), then one code: s
revoke_asset
Deprecated: use revoke_my_proof
get_current_user
Get the signed-in user's account details, plan and settings. Needs a login session: call start_login, then wait_for_login until it reports success. An API key alone cannot read this — for the key's own account use get_self_api_key or get_settings. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating
list_auth_sessions
List the current user's signed-in devices: every session that can still renew, idle ones included. Each shows its channel, user agent and expires_at, which is when the session stops being able to renew (not when its current access token expires). When called via API key, no session is marked is_current. NOT AVAILABLE HERE: This tool is not available on the hosted Proof MCP server: it needs the aut
revoke_auth_session
Sign out one device (session) by ID. Over a signed-in session it cannot end the current one (that is logout). Over an API key it can end any of the account's sessions. NOT AVAILABLE HERE: This tool is not available on the hosted Proof MCP server: it needs the auth:read or auth:write scope, which the hosted server never grants (an agent holding it could list and sign out the owner's devices). The a
get_usage
Get usage metrics for the authenticated account. Shows verification counts, API calls, and quota usage. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_platform_summary
Get a one-call account snapshot: quota with end-of-month projection, request health (pending/completed/expired counts + success rate), per-channel completion rates, approval channel counts, and active API key count. The same data the dashboard home renders. The hitl_channels sub-object requires the hitl:read scope. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authen
get_settings
Get account settings: the outbound webhook endpoint with its event subscriptions, and the default proof lifetime. Branding (name, logo, colour, email theme, support email) belongs to each sub-account: read it with get_sub_account. The webhook signing secret is NOT returned to an API key — the response reports webhook.secret_set instead, and the value is shown only when it is made: in the update_se
update_settings
Update account settings: the outbound webhook endpoint with its event subscriptions, and the default proof lifetime. Branding belongs to each sub-account: change it with update_sub_account. Setting the first webhook endpoint creates the signing secret and returns it in this response; the value is returned only when this call created or rotated it, so record it then. ACCESS: needs a Proof account.
export_data
Export a complete copy of your account's data (GDPR Articles 15 and 20), or check on one. Owner only: sign in with start_login first (a connection with only an API key is refused user_session_required). The first call starts the export; it is prepared in the background, and the account owner is told by email (or on their login channel) with a link that downloads it only while they are signed in —
search
Prefix-anchored global account search across six resource buckets (verification_requests, verifications, hitl, confirmations, authorizations, api_keys). Case-sensitive prefix match over indexed plaintext fields only; recipient identifiers are masked. Results are scoped to the authenticated account. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then cal
get_self_api_key
Get the calling API key's own redacted metadata (id, name, key_prefix, environment, scopes, last_used_at, revoked_at, created_at) for agent self-inspection. Never returns the key hash or full secret. Requires API-key auth — a JWT session has no single-key context (returns 400 api_key_required). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call th
get_api_key_usage
Get per-API-key usage for a given key id: verification counts by type/channel/status, plus verification-request/confirmation/authorization totals, and attribution context (attribution_cutoff_at, attributed_fraction). The counts cover the key and every key it replaced (api_key.replaced_key_ids). Counts only — no recipient identifiers. Scoped to the authenticated account; an API-key caller may read
get_company
Get the account company profile: legal name, registration code, country, EU VAT number, billing address and billing email, with the state of the VAT number VIES check. company is null before one is saved. Needs settings:read on an account-wide key; a key bound to one sub-account is refused account_key_required, since this is the account itself. The owner edits it in the dashboard on the Billing pa
list_templates
List the custom message templates of one sub-account, organized by channel and message type. Templates belong to a sub-account, not to the account: profile_id picks it — omitted, a sub-account key lists its own sub-account and an account-wide key the primary sub-account. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_log
get_default_templates
Get the default message templates — one for each channel and message type a message is actually sent for. These are the built-in templates a sub-account sends when it has no custom template of its own. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_template
Get the template a sub-account sends for a channel and message type: its custom template if set (scope "project"), otherwise the default (scope "default"). The response names the sub-account in profile_id. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
update_template
Create or update a sub-account's custom template for a channel and message type, replacing the default for that sub-account only. Name the brand with {{business_name}}: a template spelling out a sub-account's own name is refused (template_hardcoded_name). A template for a channel and message type no message is sent for, or using a variable that message never fills, is still saved, with an entry in
delete_template
Delete a sub-account's custom template, reverting that sub-account to the default template for the channel and message type. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
preview_template
Preview a template with sample data before saving, as a sub-account would send it. Shows how the message will look with placeholder variables filled in. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
render_template
Render the template a sub-account sends — its custom template, otherwise the default — with provided variables. Returns the fully rendered message content. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_webhook_stats
Get webhook delivery statistics including total deliveries, success/failure counts, and recent activity. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_webhook_deliveries
List webhook delivery attempts with pagination and filtering. Shows delivery status, response codes, and timestamps. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_webhook_delivery
Get details of a single webhook delivery attempt including request/response payloads and retry history. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
retry_webhook_delivery
Retry a failed webhook delivery. Creates a new delivery attempt with the same payload to the configured endpoint. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_webhook_endpoints
List the account's webhook endpoints (URL, events, scope, sub-accounts, status). Secrets are never listed. A sub-account key sees only the endpoints scoped to exactly its own sub-account. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_webhook_endpoint
Get one webhook endpoint by ID. The signing secret is not returned (only create_webhook_endpoint and rotate_webhook_endpoint_secret return it). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
create_webhook_endpoint
Add a webhook endpoint. An event reaches every active endpoint whose scope includes the event's sub-account and whose events match; an account-level event reaches "all"-scope endpoints only. An account still delivering to the single webhook URL in its settings is moved onto endpoints by this call (that URL becomes an "all"-scope endpoint with the same secret and events). The response carries the e
update_webhook_endpoint
Update a webhook endpoint: its URL, events, scope, sub-accounts, status or description. Every field is optional, but send at least one. Changing the scope to "selected" without profile_ids keeps the stored list. The signing secret is unchanged (rotate it with rotate_webhook_endpoint_secret). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this
delete_webhook_endpoint
Delete a webhook endpoint. It receives no new events; deliveries already queued to it are still attempted, signed with the secret they were queued with. Cannot be undone. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
rotate_webhook_endpoint_secret
Replace a webhook endpoint's signing secret and return the new one — this and create_webhook_endpoint are the only times a secret is returned, so store it now. New deliveries are signed with the new secret; deliveries already queued keep the secret they were queued with. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_log
get_subscription
Get the current subscription details including plan, status, billing period, and usage limits. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_balance
Get the prepaid balance (in euro cents and mills), the low-balance threshold, the top-up amounts on offer and the auto top-up setting. Proofs past the plan's included amount are drawn from this balance; once billing is live, an account whose balance is at or below zero is refused new proof requests (402 balance_empty) until it tops up. billing_enabled says whether billing is live. Topping up and c
list_balance_ledger
List the prepaid balance history, newest first: every top-up, refund and adjustment, and one usage row per month for that month's deductions. Amounts are signed euro cents (credits positive). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_sub_accounts
List every sub-account of the authenticated account, the primary one included. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_profiles
Deprecated: use list_sub_accounts
create_sub_account
Create a new sub-account with optional display name, bio, avatar, business info, email branding (theme, support email), and theme settings. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
create_profile
Deprecated: use create_sub_account
get_sub_account
Get one sub-account by ID, with its full details including theme, custom links, and verification display settings. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_profile
Deprecated: use get_sub_account
update_sub_account
Update a sub-account by ID. Supports changing display info, email branding (theme, support email), theme, custom links, and verification display settings. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
update_profile
Deprecated: use update_sub_account
delete_sub_account
Delete a sub-account. Revokes its API keys, archives the approval channels and declines the pending requests created with its own keys, keeps its history but unlinks it, deletes its message templates, and retires its username for good. The last sub-account cannot be deleted; deleting the primary sub-account makes the oldest remaining one primary (the response names it). In a start_login session: o
delete_profile
Deprecated: use delete_sub_account
set_primary_sub_account
Make a sub-account the primary one. The previous primary sub-account becomes secondary. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
set_primary_profile
Deprecated: use set_primary_sub_account
update_sub_account_page_proofs
Update which verified assets (proofs) are displayed on one named sub-account. Controls visibility, privacy masking, ordering, and labels. For the primary sub-account in a signed-in session, update_public_page_proofs does the same. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
update_profile_proofs
Deprecated: use update_sub_account_page_proofs
get_current_sub_account
Get the current sub-account record: with a sub-account key, that key's own sub-account; otherwise the account's primary sub-account. The first call creates a primary sub-account if the account has none (never for a sub-account key, which gets profile_not_found). Returns profile details, theme, custom links, and public proof display settings. Its write twin is update_public_page (the same record).
get_my_profile
Deprecated: use get_current_sub_account
update_public_page
Update the record get_current_sub_account reads: a sub-account key's own sub-account, otherwise the primary sub-account (never creates one). Takes presentation fields only — display name, bio, avatar, theme, custom links, and verification display settings; business details, the primary flag and email branding go through update_sub_account. In the dashboard, the Profile page (https://proof.holdings
update_my_profile
Deprecated: use update_public_page
list_public_page_proof_options
List the verified proofs that can be shown on the Public page (each one eligible to be listed with update_public_page_proofs). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_profile_assets
Deprecated: use list_public_page_proof_options
rotate_callback_secret
Rotate a sub-account's callback signing secret — the secret that signs every callback_url delivery of its verification requests — and return the new one. This is the only time it is returned, so store it now. Callback deliveries already queued keep the secret they were signed with. An account still delivering through its settings webhook URL is switched over to webhook endpoints first. ACCESS: nee
preview_sub_account_deletion
Preview what delete_sub_account would do to one sub-account, without changing anything: the counts the dashboard Delete sub-account dialog shows and the sub-account that would take its place, or why deletion is refused (allowed: false). Needs profiles:read; a key bound to a sub-account previews only its own. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate)
preview_profile_deletion
Deprecated: use preview_sub_account_deletion
list_emails
List all email addresses associated with the authenticated account. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this tool.
remove_email
Remove an email address from the account. Always requires one code: start_2fa_for_action with action_type email_remove and targets [this email id]. Revokes every proof of the address and your own consents naming it, declines pending confirmations waiting on it, moves Lookalike Watch alerts to your remaining primary email (or stops the watch when none is left), deletes the record, signs out your ot
set_email_account_access
Turn Account access on or off for one of the account's email addresses: whether it signs in to the account and confirms its sensitive actions (2FA step-ups). Every new email address starts on. Either direction requires one code: start_2fa_for_action with action_type account_access and targets ["act:access_on", "<id>"] to turn it on or ["act:access_off", "<id>"] to turn it off; without it the call
set_primary_email
Set an email address as the primary email for the account. Always requires one code: start_2fa_for_action with action_type email_primary (no targets); without it the call answers 403 2fa_required. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this tool.
start_add_email
Start adding a new email address. Sends an OTP code to the email. Returns a session ID: when the user has the code, pass it with that session ID to verify_email_otp (resend_email_otp if it did not arrive; get_add_email_status reads the session). ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating th
get_add_email_status
Check the status of an in-progress email addition by session ID. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this tool.
verify_email_otp
Submit the OTP code to verify an email addition. Completes the add-email flow if the code is correct. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this tool.
resend_email_otp
Resend the OTP code for an in-progress email addition. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this tool.
preview_email_removal
Preview what remove_email would do to one email address, without changing anything: the counts the dashboard Remove dialog shows, or the reason removal would be refused. Needs a signed-in session, like remove_email. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open
list_phones
List all phone numbers associated with the authenticated account. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this tool.
remove_phone
Remove a phone number from the account. Always requires one code: start_2fa_for_action with action_type phone_remove and targets [this phone id]. Revokes every proof of the number and your own consents naming it, declines pending confirmations waiting on it, flags approval setups left with no approver, deletes the record and its messenger links, signs out your other devices, and names the new prim
set_phone_account_access
Turn Account access on or off for one of the account's phone numbers: whether it signs in to the account and confirms its sensitive actions (2FA step-ups). Every new phone number starts on. Either direction requires one code: start_2fa_for_action with action_type account_access and targets ["act:access_on", "<id>"] to turn it on or ["act:access_off", "<id>"] to turn it off; without it the call ans
set_primary_phone
Set a phone number as the primary phone for the account. Always requires one code: start_2fa_for_action with action_type phone_primary (no targets); without it the call answers 403 2fa_required. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this tool.
start_add_phone
Start adding a new phone number by reverse OTP: the user starts the exchange themselves and nothing is sent before they do; the response's `instructions` field says what they do (on telegram the bot then asks them to tap a button that shares their number). Returns a session ID; on telegram/whatsapp also deep_link, qr_code (base64 PNG) and qr_text (UTF-8 text QR), and on sms sms_message and sms_did
get_add_phone_status
Check the status of an in-progress phone addition by session ID. Poll until terminal state. Before calling this for a challenge you created, make sure your reply text already shows the user what to act on — the link itself, the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox; a link that appeared only in a tool result is one they never saw. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_
preview_phone_removal
Preview what remove_phone would do to one phone, without changing anything: the counts the dashboard Remove dialog shows, or the reason removal would be refused. Needs a signed-in session, like remove_phone. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this too
list_api_keys
List all API keys for the authenticated account. Returns key metadata (not the secret key values). ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this tool.
create_api_key
Create a new API key. The secret key value is returned ONLY in this response — store it securely. Note: the secret will be visible in the AI conversation context. Optionally bind the key to a sub-account via profile_id — outbound messages sent with the key are then branded as that sub-account. Agent usage: This operation requires 2FA. Before calling, complete the 2FA flow: (1) call start_2fa with
revoke_api_key
Revoke an API key by ID. The key will immediately stop working. This action cannot be undone. Agent usage: This operation requires 2FA. Before calling, complete the 2FA flow: (1) call start_2fa with action_type "api_key_revoke", (2) wait for user to verify the code, (3) poll get_2fa_status until "verified", (4) then call revoke_api_key. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, s
regenerate_api_key
Regenerate an API key: issues a new key (a new id and secret) with the same name, environment, scopes and sub-account. The new key expires when the old one would have (expires_at in this response). A key whose expires_at has passed (see list_api_keys) is refused (api_key_expired), so check it before starting 2FA: for a key an MCP sign-in minted the message reads "This key expired on <day>. Connect
start_2fa
Start a two-factor authentication challenge for a sensitive operation. Sends a verification code via the chosen channel. Returns a session ID, and for messaging channels: deep_link, qr_code (base64 PNG), and qr_text (UTF-8 text QR for terminal display). Agent usage — full 2FA flow: (1) Call start_2fa with the appropriate action_type and channel. (2) Present the challenge, and do NOT announce a mes
get_2fa_status
Check the status of a 2FA session by session ID. Returns whether the challenge has been completed, is pending, or has expired. Agent usage: Poll this after calling start_2fa. Check every few seconds. Terminal states: "verified" (proceed with protected operation), "expired" (restart with start_2fa). While "pending", the user has not yet entered their code. Before calling this for a challenge you cr
verify_2fa
Submit a verification code to complete a 2FA challenge. Rate limited to 10 attempts per minute. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this tool.
verify_2fa_magic_link
Complete a 2FA challenge using a magic link token (received via email). No code submission needed — the token itself is the proof. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this tool.
wait_for_2fa
Poll a 2FA session until the user completes the challenge. Uses exponential backoff (2s initial, 1.5x, 30s max) with jitter. Agent usage: Call this after start_2fa with the returned session_id. Terminal states: "verified" (challenge completed — proceed with the protected operation), "expired" (offer to restart with start_2fa). Before polling, present start_2fa's challenge: pass its `deep_link` to
list_domains
List all domains for the authenticated account. Returns domain metadata including verification status. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this tool.
add_domain
Add a new domain to verify ownership. Optionally specify email sending intent and verification method. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this tool.
get_domain
Get details of a specific domain by ID, including verification status, DNS records, and provider connections. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this tool.
delete_domain
Remove a domain from the account. Revokes every proof of the domain and every delegation issued from it (for good — re-adding the domain does not bring them back), deletes the domain and its records, and removes our _proof TXT record and the Resend sending domain where we can; the response lists what is left for you to remove by hand. Owner only, in a start_login session, with one code: start_2fa_
verify_domain
Trigger domain verification. Checks DNS records or other verification method to confirm domain ownership. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this tool.
connect_cloudflare
Connect a Cloudflare API token to a domain: the server publishes the verification record through it. The domain is verified once that record is live in public DNS — often at once, else status "verifying" while the server keeps checking (call get_domain). Note: the API token will be visible in the AI conversation context. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its
connect_godaddy
Connect GoDaddy credentials to a domain: a Personal Access Token (api_token, permissions domains.domain:read and domains.dns:update), or a Production API key with its secret. The server publishes the verification record through it; the domain is verified once that record is live in public DNS — often at once, else status "verifying" while the server keeps checking (call get_domain). Note: the cred
connect_dns_provider
Connect a generic DNS provider to a domain using provider-specific credentials. The server publishes the verification record through it; the domain is verified once that record is live in public DNS — often at once, else status "verifying" while the server keeps checking (call get_domain). Note: credentials will be visible in the AI conversation context. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: c
add_verification_provider
Add an additional DNS provider for verification to an already-verified domain. Note: credentials will be visible in the AI conversation context. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this tool.
get_dns_providers
Get metadata for all supported DNS providers, including required credential fields and documentation links. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this tool.
verify_domain_with_credentials
Publish a pending domain's verification record using previously stored DNS credentials. The domain is verified once that record is live in public DNS — often at once, else status "verifying" while the server keeps checking (call get_domain). Use when credentials are already connected. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then
check_domain_credentials
Check if stored DNS credentials have access to a domain. Use before triggering verification to confirm the credentials work. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this tool.
start_domain_email_verification
Start domain verification via corporate email. Sends a verification code to a standard admin email address at the domain. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this tool.
confirm_domain_email_code
Confirm domain email verification by submitting the code sent to the corporate email address. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this tool.
resend_domain_email
Resend the domain verification email. Rate limited to 3 requests per minute. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this tool.
setup_domain_email
Register a verified domain with Proof's email provider (Resend) for sending. The result carries the DKIM/SPF DNS records to publish (`resend.dkim_records`) and their status. `from_email`, if given, must be on this domain and is stored as the preferred sender. Proof does not send from customer domains yet: verification emails still come from Proof's own address, and the stored `from_email` is not u
check_domain_email_status
Check the email sending setup status for a domain, including DNS record configuration progress. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this tool.
list_dns_credentials
List all stored DNS provider credentials for the authenticated account. Returns credential metadata (not secret values). ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this tool.
create_dns_credential
Store DNS provider credentials for automated domain verification. Note: credentials will be visible in the AI conversation context. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this tool.
delete_dns_credential
Delete a stored DNS provider credential. Domains using this credential will need new credentials for automated verification. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this tool.
list_my_requests
List verification requests created by the authenticated user. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — either opens this tool — then call this tool again.
list_incoming_requests
List incoming verification requests where the authenticated user is the subject. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this tool.
create_user_request
Create a new verification request to ask another user to share verified assets; list_my_requests shows its progress and cancel_user_request withdraws it. Each asset is an object naming its type, e.g. { "type": "email" }. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT
cancel_user_request
Cancel a pending verification request. Only the creator can cancel. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this tool.
extend_request
Extend the expiration time of a pending verification request. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this tool.
share_request_email
Email the link of a pending verification request to a recipient. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this tool.
start_user_domain_verification
Start a self-service domain verification session. The user proves ownership of a domain via DNS or HTTP challenge. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this tool.
get_user_domain_verification_status
Get the current status of a domain verification session, including challenge details. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this tool.
check_user_domain_verification
Trigger a check on the domain verification challenge. Call after placing DNS record or HTTP file. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this tool.
claim_username
Claim a unique username for the authenticated user's Public page. Usernames must be 3-30 characters, alphanumeric and underscores only. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. Authenticating this client alone does NOT open this tool.
update_public_page_proofs
Update which verified proofs are visible on the public page of the primary sub-account (the one get_current_sub_account reads), including visibility, masking, and display order. Needs a signed-in session. To do the same for a named sub-account, use update_sub_account_page_proofs. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call
update_public_proofs
Deprecated: use update_public_page_proofs
create_authorization
Create a new authorization request. Authorizations grant permission to send confirmations to a user via a specific channel. The user must approve the authorization before confirmations can be sent; get_authorization reads its status, which stays pending until they answer. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_lo
get_authorization
Get an authorization by ID. Returns the current state of the authorization including status and usage statistics. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_authorizations
List authorizations with optional filters. Returns paginated results. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
revoke_authorization
Revoke an active or pending authorization. Only authorizations with status "active" or "pending" can be revoked. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
export_authorizations
Export authorizations as CSV or JSON. Supports date range and status filtering. Maximum 10,000 records. CSV comes back as `{ content_type, body, truncated }` with the file in `body`; a body over 100,000 characters is cut at the last full line (`truncated: true`, `total_chars`) — narrow `from`/`to` or `status` and export again for the rest. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (C
create_confirmation
Create a HITL confirmation request. Sends an approval request to the channels configured on the referenced approval channel. First response wins. Agent usage: The approval channel referenced by hitl_id must be authorized before you can create confirmations. If this returns a 403 or "not authorized" error, call request_approval_channel_authorization on the approval channel first, then wait for the
get_confirmation
Get a confirmation by ID. Returns the full confirmation including status, response, and proof token. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_confirmations
List confirmations with optional filters. Returns paginated results with status, approval channel and sub-account (profile_id) filtering. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_confirmation_approval_link
Get the approval link of the approval channel owner: it is decided with the config's own key, so it is for the owner to approve or deny the confirmation themselves. An approver cannot use it — an approver's link goes only to their own channel, and "Send again" (`POST /api/v1/confirmations/{id}/resend`, which no tool calls yet) is what sends it there again. Every call returns the same owner link un
wait_for_confirmation
Poll a confirmation until the approver responds. Uses exponential backoff (2s initial, 1.5x, 30s max) with jitter. Agent usage: Call this after create_confirmation with the returned confirmation ID. Terminal states: "approved" (action authorized — check the proof_token), "denied" (action rejected). While "pending", the approver has not yet responded. This poll returns no link — the approval reques
resend_confirmation
Send a pending confirmation again to the people it went to: each recipient gets a fresh link bound to them, through their own channel, expiring when the confirmation does; their earlier links stop working (410 approval_link_superseded). The response carries counts only, never a link. Recipients are the approvers whose authorization is still active and whose key the stored message is encrypted for,
create_approval_channel
Create a HITL (Human-in-the-Loop) config. Defines which messaging channels receive approval requests and the default timeout. Agent usage: After creating an approval channel, you must call request_approval_channel_authorization before it can be used with create_confirmation. For Telegram channels, use create_chat_id_discovery first to discover the user's chat ID, then include it in the channel con
create_hitl
Deprecated: use create_approval_channel
get_approval_channel
Get an approval channel by ID. Returns the config including channels, timeout, and status. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_hitl
Deprecated: use get_approval_channel
list_approval_channels
List approval channels with optional filters. Returns paginated results. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_hitls
Deprecated: use list_approval_channels
update_approval_channel
Update an approval channel. Can change name, channels, or timeout. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
update_hitl
Deprecated: use update_approval_channel
archive_approval_channel
Delete (archive) an approval channel. Sets status to archived. Cannot be used for new confirmations after deletion. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
delete_hitl
Deprecated: use archive_approval_channel
request_approval_channel_authorization
Request authorization for an approval channel. Sends consent requests to all configured channels (Telegram/WhatsApp). Users must approve before confirmations can be sent. Agent usage: This must be completed before create_confirmation will work for this approval channel. The consent request is DELIVERED to each channel — the response carries no link to show. It returns `authorizations` — one entry
request_hitl_authorization
Deprecated: use request_approval_channel_authorization
create_chat_id_discovery
Create a Telegram chat ID discovery token. Returns a deep_link, qr_code (base64 PNG), and qr_text (UTF-8 text QR for terminal display). The user opens the link in Telegram, which reveals their chat ID for approval channel setup. Agent usage: pass the response's `deep_link` to render_auth_link so the user can click or scan it. Never hand `qr_text` to a link renderer — it is that same link already r
poll_chat_id_discovery
Poll a chat ID discovery token. Returns the discovered Telegram chat ID, user ID, and username once the user interacts with the bot. Before calling this for a challenge you created, make sure your reply text already shows the user what to act on — the link itself, the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox; a link that appeared only in a tool result is one they never saw. ACCESS: need
wait_for_chat_id_discovery
Poll a chat ID discovery token until the user interacts with the Telegram bot. Uses exponential backoff (2s initial, 1.5x, 30s max) with jitter. Agent usage: Call this after create_chat_id_discovery. Present the discovery response's `deep_link` with render_auth_link first, then poll with the returned token. Terminal states: "completed" (chat_id discovered — use it when creating an approval channel
get_approval_channel_keys
Get the encryption keypair for an approval channel. With `hitl:read` it returns the public key, encrypted private key, KDF salt, and key ID (kid). A key holding `confirmations:create` without `hitl:read` receives only `public_key` and `kid` — what a confirmation message is sealed to, never the private-key material. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authen
get_hitl_keys
Deprecated: use get_approval_channel_keys
upload_approval_channel_keys
Upload an encryption keypair for an approval channel. The server validates the RSA-4096 public key and computes the key ID. Note: the encrypted_private_key is already encrypted client-side with the user's password — the server never sees the password. The owner sets that password in the dashboard under Settings → Approvals password (https://proof.holdings/dev). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authe
upload_hitl_keys
Deprecated: use upload_approval_channel_keys
delete_approval_channel_keys
Delete the encryption keypair from an approval channel. WARNING: Existing ciphertexts will become permanently unreadable. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
delete_hitl_keys
Deprecated: use delete_approval_channel_keys
create_identity_challenge
Create a Proof of Me cross-channel identity challenge (CONFIRM) for an enrolled Circle member. The account holder approves/denies on a channel different from the one the suspicious contact reached the member on. Agent usage: poll get_identity_challenge with the returned ID until it leaves pending (confirmed, denied, cancelled, failed, expired or revoked). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticat
get_identity_challenge
Get a Proof of Me identity challenge by ID. Returns its status (pending, confirmed, denied, cancelled, failed, expired, revoked or suspended), the channel the CONFIRM ran on, and — once the person being checked decided — the proof token and its proof_id. Poll this for resolution. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again.
create_circle
Create a Circle — a named group of trusted contacts (the people-primitive powering Proof of Me and Approvals-on-Circle). Optionally seed initial members; each member's declared channels are stored so they can be invited to enroll. Agent usage: after creating a Circle, add members with add_circle_member (or seed them here), then invite_circle_member to mint the enrollment deep link each contact tap
list_circles
List Circles with optional filters. Archived Circles are excluded by default; pass status="archived" to surface them. Returns paginated results. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_circle
Get a Circle by ID. Returns the Circle including its members and per-member channel presence booleans (an identifier is NEVER returned — SEC-PM-006). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
update_circle
Update a Circle's name and/or owner name. Omitted fields are left unchanged; the sub-account and identity binding is set at creation only. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
delete_circle
Archive a Circle (soft delete — sets status to archived). It stops appearing in the default list but is recoverable via list_circles with status="archived". ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
add_circle_member
Add a pending member to a Circle by name, with an optional pre-declared WhatsApp phone. The Telegram chat id is captured later when the member taps the enrollment deep link. Agent usage: after adding a member, call invite_circle_member to mint the single-use enrollment link the member taps to bind their messenger identity. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp
list_circle_members
List a Circle's members. Each member carries channel-presence booleans (has_telegram / has_whatsapp) and the masked phone they enrolled from (enrolled_phone_hint, e.g. +9••••••4171) — a full identifier is NEVER returned (SEC-PM-006). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
invite_circle_member
Mint a single-use enrollment invite for a Circle member. Returns Telegram + WhatsApp deep links and a QR code; the member taps the channel-matched link to bind their messenger identity to the Circle. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
create_circle_member_drill
Fire an on-demand Proof of Me drill against one enrolled member — a real cross-channel identity challenge carrying the scheduled-safety-check label (the account owner practices confirming). Complements the automated daily drill + monthly reinforcement sweeps. On Pay as you go a live key is refused `422 plan_upgrade_required`; a test key is not, and its drill reaches the member on Telegram only (`4
remove_circle_member
Remove a member from a Circle. Deletes the member's channels and revokes any live authorizations that routed through them. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
add_circle_member_channel
Declare a channel for a Circle member. Returns 409 if that channel type already exists on the member. The identifier is a Telegram chat id or an E.164 WhatsApp phone (per-channel format validated server-side). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_circle_member_channels
List a Circle member's channels. Returns channel metadata only (channel, status, verified_at) — an identifier is NEVER returned (SEC-PM-006). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
remove_circle_member_channel
Remove a channel from a Circle member. Removing the last channel is allowed (the member simply becomes unreachable). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
create_delegation
Create a delegation (Proof of Delegation): a control-proven domain authorizes a typed url/purl artifact and receives a publishable signed token. The attestation is that the domain's controller authorized this artifact — nothing more; it says nothing about the artifact or the business behind it. Each mint is a billable proof. A requested lifetime longer than the control proof's remainder is rejecte